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Abstract  
This paper presents the setup, the assessment 
methods, and the results of a flight trial that was 
conducted in June 2016 in order to demonstrate 
integration of remotely piloted aircraft systems 
(RPAS) into the current airspace, while also 
acknowledging that there are challenges to overcome. 
An RPAS demonstrator received a flight plan from 
the ground control station (GCS) using a ground-
based data link, departing from Braunschweig-
Wolfsburg airport and flying towards Leipzig/Halle 
airport on published routing. When approaching 
Leipzig/Halle airport, the data link was lost as 
predicted, and the arrival procedure was altered by air 
traffic control (ATC), which showed that an 
additional and dedicated RPAS controller at arrival 
airports might be valuable and advantageous.  
Focus of this paper is the description of the 
components that were used during the trial and their 
interconnectivity, the evaluation of quantitative 
recorded data and the qualitative experienced 
difficulties and challenges. Assessment of the 
recorded data is divided into data link quality, data 
link latency, and flight following performance 
(vertical and lateral following accuracy), with the 
latter being linked to existing performance based 
navigation (PBN) parameters by ICAO and height-
keeping performance values by EASA. The paper 
concludes with a discussion on the investigated 
integration concept. 
Introduction 
With the increasing importance of unmanned 
aerial systems (UAS) for various purposes and 
stakeholders, both military and civilian, the issue to 
integrate unmanned vehicles into the current airspace 
becomes imminent. Platforms range from small, user-
friendly off-the-shelf drones (“micro UAS”) to large 
transportation aircraft. One possible scenario for civil 
UAS or RPAS operation is freight transport, ranging 
from small and urgent deliveries (e.g. organs or spare 
parts) and crisis relief (e.g. humanitarian logistics or 
optimal coverage of a crisis area) to scheduled large 
freight transport, replacing or extending current 
conventional manned freight transportation. 
However, the airspace integration of such novel 
systems is still a major challenge. Within this work, a 
flight trial was performed to investigate several issues 
of the integration of large RPAS into the existing air 
traffic management (ATM) architecture. 
A major concern is the maintenance of safety for 
all airspace users; manned and unmanned, 
commercial and private. An intuitive way of 
integration that is realizable within near future and 
without adaptations of current ATM is the usage of 
support systems that make the RPAS appear just like 
a conventional manned aircraft for ATC and other 
airspace users. 
To realize and demonstrate this approach of 
RPAS integration, different systems are required. 
Most importantly, a stable data link is necessary to 
exchange information between the aircraft and the 
GCS. A flight management system (FMS) on board 
the aircraft calculates a 4D trajectory based on the 
requested flight plan, which can then be followed 
automatically by a digital autopilot, or manually by 
steering commands for the experimental pilot (e.g. by 
using a flight director). Voice communication has to 
be implemented via the aircraft in such a way that the 
air traffic controller can use the regular frequency and 
reach the remote pilot on the ground. 
In June 2016, a flight trial with an Airbus A320, 
which was used as an RPAS demonstrator, was 
conducted. The purpose of this flight trial was to 
show the overall functionality of the involved 
systems and to prove the concept of RPAS 
integration into the existing airspace. The RPAS 
demonstrator was used to simulate an RPAS flying 
into a cargo hub airport (Leipzig/Halle, EDDP). The 
trial was analyzed afterwards to assess the overall 
functionality, the flight path following accuracy of 
the RPAS demonstrator under those conditions, and 
the behavior of the experimental FMS in case of a 
data link loss. The RPAS demonstrator received 
trajectory instructions from a GCS via an 
  
experimental FMS. A ground based S band data link 
was used to exchange information with the RPAS 
demonstrator, which is based at the Institute of Flight 
Guidance at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) in 
Braunschweig. As the used data link requires a direct 
line of sight, it was obvious that the link would be 
lost at a certain time of the approach into 
Leipzig/Halle, which is approx. 90 NM away. 
In preparation of this flight, the routing was 
negotiated with the responsible ATC supervisor. 
Standard instrumental flight rules (IFR) routing was 
explicitly and deliberately used to ensure predictable 
flight behavior. A standard instrument departure, a 
published en-route segment and a standard arrival 
route were chosen. Several different routings were 
prepared, all based on standard routings, to be 
prepared for different weather and traffic situations. 
For the actual flight, the published required 
navigation performance (RNP) procedure for runway 
26R was used. This approach has a lateral routing 
that leads towards the parallel runway (26L) first and 
then leads to runway 26R for landing. In practice, this 
approach is not used by approaching aircraft, as they 
usually get radar vectors and follow a trombone 
procedure for the approach. This was not apparent to 
the people involved in the planning of the trials and 
led to confusion on ATC side during the trials. 
In this paper, the flight test infrastructure and the 
results of the flight trial will be presented. It will 
show the behavior of the RPAS demonstrator during 
a data link loss and the flight path following 
performance during flight. Additionally, it will show 
that the use of an on-site RPAS controller who is 
aware of local procedure and capable of speaking the 
local language could facilitate the integration. This 
RPAS controller would be located at the landing 




DLR’s Advanced Technologies Testing Aircraft 
(ATRA) was used as an RPAS demonstrator to 
demonstrate the concept and the functionality of the 
systems. ATRA is an Airbus A320 which was 
modified for scientific purposes. Flight test 
instrumentation was integrated to display, store and 
distribute the current flight data. In addition, 
experimental equipment required for the given 
experiment is installed on board.  
Setup of Flight Trial 
An experimental cockpit display is installed on 
the right hand side of the cockpit. On this display, 
information which is generated by the installed 
equipment can be shown to the experimental pilot.  
During the flight trials, the following setup was 
used, which is also depicted in Figure 1. A remote 
pilot on the ground monitors the state of the aircraft 
using the GCS U-Fly. New flight paths and direct 
control commands can be uplinked to the aircraft 
using a data link for command, control, and 
communication (C³). The data received by the aircraft 
is converted into steering commands and displayed 





GCS U-FlyMonitoring & Control
C³ Datalink
Flight Path & 
Control Commands
Figure 1. Setup of Flight Trial 
The data presented to the experimental pilot 
consists primarily of a map display and a primary 
flight display (PFD). On the PFD, a flight director 
(crossbars) is displayed based on the steering 
commands from the ground station. The experimental 
  
pilot on-board the aircraft follows the flight director 
commands manually and monitors the state of the 
aircraft. The state is also downlinked to the ground, 
using the same C³ data link, and displayed in the 
GCS. The safety pilot on the left side of the cockpit 
monitors the basic aircraft, ensures a safe flight and is 
responsible for the communication with the air traffic 
controller. 
The experimental equipment was installed in 
two 19’’ racks in the cabin of the ATRA. The 
equipment includes the data link units and PCs that 
receive the control commands and translate it into 
flight director commands. They also generate the 
display data shown to the experimental pilot. In 
addition, two global navigation satellite system 
(GNSS) receivers augmented by European 
geostationary navigation overlay service (EGNOS) 
[1] are installed for precise position information and 
analysis.  
Flight Trial Conducted 
The aim of the flight trial was the testing of the 
experimental systems and the usability of the data 
link. Especially the reconnection after the expected 
link loss was in focus of this trial. Therefore, a test 
flight from Braunschweig-Wolfsburg airport (ICAO: 
EDVE) to Leipzig/Halle airport (ICAO: EDDP) was 
conducted. First, a data link test was performed to the 
north and then a routing to EDDP was planned. The 
recorded flown track is visualized in Figure 2. In 
order to behave like a normal flight, a standard 
routing was used for the flight. In addition, a standard 
RNP approach was prepared. The lateral approach 
path can be found in Figure 4. The approach is 
published and free for operational use by Deutsche 
Flugsicherung (DFS) [2]. 
 
Figure 2. Ground Track Flown 
 
Figure 3. SBAS Altitude 
 
 
Figure 4. Approach Chart for EDDP RWY26R 
Expectation was that the routing and the 
approach would not induce abnormal behavior, 
especially at the busy cargo hub EDDP. As it turned 
out, this type of approach was not commonly used by 
regular approaching traffic and led to some issues 
which will be described in a later section. As the 
airports are approx. 90 NM away from each other and 
the data link requires a radio line of sight (RLOS) 
connection, it was expected that a data links loss 
would occur at a certain descent altitude. Especially 
the reconnection after a go-around procedure at 
Leipzig/Halle airport was of interest here. 
To ensure voice communication between the 
RPAS demonstrator and the GCS, a voice over 
internet protocol (VoIP) software was used. As long 
as a data link connection was established, the crew on 




Different measures can be applied for the 
validation of safety aspects. In this experiment, four 
different measures were chosen to show the 
robustness and reliability of the underlying concept 
considerations. One of these aspects is the 
maintenance of a robust and reliable C³ data link. 
Therefore, the data link quality and latency is 
examined and analyzed with regard to possible 
impacts to the control of the RPAS demonstrator and 
the communication between remote pilot and ATC. 
Another important parameter when validating 
the safety of the flight path is the flight path 
following accuracy of the RPAS demonstrator during 
the experiment. The accuracy can be examined in 
vertical and horizontal dimension. Both require an 
analysis of the total system error (TSE) that occurred 
during the flight test. The TSE has two main 
contributors: the flight technical error (FTE) and the 
navigation system error (NSE). Obviously, the NSE 
is dependent on the used navigation system and can 
therefore be considered as a fixed external parameter. 
In addition, the NSE is usually magnitudes smaller 
compared to the FTE and, due to these 
considerations, not subject of investigations here. A 
third, usually small, component of the TSE is the path 
definition error (PDE), which describes the difference 
between desired and defined path of the aircraft. A 
visualization of the TSE and its components can be 
found in Figure 5. 
  
 
Figure 5. Flight Technical Error according to 
ICAO Doc 9613 [3] 
The FTE value represents the ability of the 
aircraft guidance system to follow the computed 
flight path. The lateral navigation was based on a 
standard GNSS augmented by EGNOS and an 
inertial reference system. According to ICAO 
Annex 10 Volume I (Aeronautical Communication) 
[4] the horizontal accuracy during approach should 
be 16 m in 95% of the time, but the typical lateral 
accuracy is expected to be well within 3 m. The 
concept of PBN can be applied to define 
requirements for the aircraft’s lateral navigation 
accuracy. PBN defines navigation requirements 
applicable to aircraft conducting operations on 
specific routes, on an instrument approach procedure, 
or in a designated airspace. It also refers to the level 
of performance required for a specific procedure or a 
specific block of airspace. Therefore, it can be 
applied to determine the lateral FTE. When operating 
with an autopilot system, the following lateral 
deviations are defined by ICAO Doc 8168 
(Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Aircraft 
Operations) [5] ensuring that the required level of 
performance is provided: 
a) ±3.7 km (2.0 NM) in en-route mode; 
b) ±1.9 km (1.0 NM) in terminal mode; and 
c) ±0.6 km (0.3 NM) in approach mode. 
In the context of this paper, these limiting values 
for operations can be taken as a measure of safety for 
the RPAS flight experiment. In detail, the cross track 
errors are measured in meters and compared to the 
performance levels required for the respective flight 
phases.  
Another important factor when evaluating the 
flight following performance is the vertical 
performance of the aircraft. In order to ensure safe 
transition between regions, a global height-keeping 
performance specification was developed and defined 
for aircraft in EASA AMC 20-27A [6]. According to 
EASA, the aircraft’s performance should demonstrate 
on a 99.7 percent probability that vertical errors at 
altitudes above mean sea level (MSL) should be less 
than: 
• At or below 5000 ft (MSL): < 100 ft 
• 5000 ft to 10000 ft (MSL): < 150 ft 
• 10000 ft to 15000 ft (MSL): < 220 ft. 
In this paper, the vertical height-keeping 
performance is determined by comparing the 
computed and commanded altitude to the actual 
uncorrected pressure altitude over the time. Both 
measures (altitude error [ft], cross track error [NM]) 
are used in this work to validate the performance 





As described, the focus of this trial was on the 
usability of the data link and the flight path following 
accuracy. Therefore, these two parameters are 
examined here. In addition, the issues encountered 
are described as lessons learnt to support an 
integration concept that is found in a later section. 
Data Link Quality and Latency 
The data link quality is measured in packages 
per second and provides an overview of the data 
volume that was transmittable between ground 
station and aircraft during the flight experiment. 
Under perfect conditions, the maximum quality is 
5 packages per second, while a connection is 
perceived as poor with a value lower than 
1 package/sec. The progress of the data link quality 
along the flight path is displayed in Figure 6. 
Obviously, when having applied a terrestrial data 
link, the robustness of the data link is constrained by 
a direct line-of-sight connection. Thus, in this flight 
experiment the data link was foreseen to be disrupted 
when reaching the border of the data link coverage 
region (ca. 138 km distance from ground station). 
Within this range the data link quality remained at 
medium levels, showing a mean of µ = 1.9 packages 
per second with a variance of σ = 1.2 packages per 
second. With this quality level provided during the 
experiment, all flight path and steering commands as 
well as voice communication could be transmitted 
between the aircraft and the GCS without any 
disruptions. The only segments significantly showing 
a quality decrease are the flight segment at the 
beginning of the flight to test the data link range 
(segment in north direction with procedure turn) and 
the approach segment to Leipzig/Halle airport (south-
east part of the flight path displayed in Figure 6). 
The data link latency in the experiment showed 
very low values. The latency was recorded with mean 
values of µ = 0.49 seconds with a variance of 
σ = 0.6 seconds. Even in flight phases that required 
frequent updates of the flight path and strong 
coordination with the on-board crew (e.g. before 
entering the approach to EDDP), the latency 
remained at low levels and all data could be 
transmitted without any significant delay. The 
recorded values along the flight path 
(longitude/latitude) are displayed in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 6. C³ Data Link Quality [packages/sec] 
 
Figure 7. C³ Data Link Latency [sec] 
Both data link quality and latency show a high 
robustness in all flight phases and during all flight 
maneuvers (e.g. procedure turns) within the data 
link’s range of operation. 
Flight Following Performance 
The flight following performance can be 
examined with regard to the aircraft’s lateral and 
vertical accuracy when following the 4D trajectory. 
Firstly, the lateral accuracy provided by the cross 
track error is discussed. The allowed deviations are 
strongly dependent on the flight phase of the aircraft. 
Therefore, the data analysis reflects mean deviations 
  
(µ) and standard variances (σ) according to the 
experiment’s flight phases. The flight experiment 
consisted of a flight from EDVE to EDDP with a low 
approach and direct return to EDVE. Thus, all flight 
phases were conducted twice.  
 
Figure 8. Cross Track Error [NM] 
In Figure 8 the cross track error (xCTE) for the 
outbound flight is displayed. It can be seen that the 
values stay at a very low level and that the maximal 
deviations stay within ±0.18 NM. The highest 
deviations can be found during approach phase. 
During cruise the aircraft even stayed within 
±0.07 NM. This is as well reflected in the data 
evaluation. While the departure phase indicates a 
very low level of deviations with µ(xCTE) = 0.001 
and σ(xCTE) = 0.04, the cruise phase indicates small, 
but slightly higher deviations with µ(xCTE) = -0.002 
and σ(xCTE) = 0.01. The approach phase shows the 
comparably highest deviations with µ(xCTE) = -0.01 
and σ(xCTE) = 0.001. All these data stay well within 
the required levels of performance defined by ICAO 
requiring ±2 NM, ±1 NM and ±0.3 NM respectively. 
The complete data analysis for the cross track error 
separately provided for each flight phase is given in 
the table below (Table 1). 
The increased lateral deviations during approach 
result from unforeseen route adaptations that were 
commanded by ATC to the aircraft, but were not 
reflected in the aircraft’s mission planning. Whereas 
the aircraft’s mission planning is completely based 
upon published procedures, the ATC in EDDP 
applied local procedures using vector directions. This 
required multiple adaptations to the calculated flight 
path during approach. With the approach segment 
outside of the data link range, these adaptations 
needed to be implemented manually by the 
experimental pilot on board the aircraft. These 
deviations are reflected in the recorded data. 












d Departure ± 1.0 0.001 0.04 
Cruise ± 2.0 -0.002 0.01 





Departure ± 1.0 0.005 0.02 
Cruise ± 2.0 0.01 0.01 
Approach ± 0.3 0.02 0.04 
 
Secondly, the flight experiment is analyzed with 
regard to vertical performance accuracy. For the 
vertical performance different requirements 
according to the flight phase can be applied. Below 
5000 ft MSL the vertical error (xAE) should be 
smaller than 100 ft. Therefore, this value is set for the 
data evaluation as limiting value for the approach 
phase. Furthermore, the recorded data during the 
cruise phase are compared to the limiting values 
provided for flight levels (FL) between FL100 and 
FL150. Therefore, the limiting value is set here to 
220 ft. For a detailed evaluation, two representative 
flight segments from the outbound flight path were 
extracted to show vertical deviations during cruise 
(flight segment in FL130) and approach (RNP 
approach in EDDP). The results from the data 
analysis for both flight segments are listed in Table 2.  
Table 2. Altitude Error [ft] for Cruise and 





µ(xAE) 1.04 -39.8 
σ(xAE) 19.5 54.13 
max(xAE) 36.4 108.0 
min(xAE) -31.4 -128.0 
EASA req. [ft] ±220.0 ±100.0 
 
It can be seen that during the level segment, 
chosen for evaluating the cruise flight accuracy, 
altitude deviations between 36.4 ft and -31.4 ft were 
  
recorded. The mean altitude error in this flight 
segment is µ(xAE) = 1.04 ft with a comparatively high 
variance of σ(xAE) = 19.5 ft. These values stay well 
within the limits defined for the cruise phase. The 
progress of the altitude error for this level segment is 
visualized in Figure 9. Overall, the figure and the 
data show a very high vertical accuracy. However, 
especially when the flight altitude had to be changed, 
increased deviations with up to ±35 ft were recorded. 
These deviations can be explained by the manual 
control of the aircraft, resulting in the experimental 
pilot focusing on lateral deviations and handling 
altitude commands based on experience and 
navigation requirements. This circumstance may 
have caused a delayed implementation of altitude 
commands. 
 
Figure 9. Altitude Error during Level [ft] 
 
Figure 10. Altitude Error during Approach [ft] 
Analyzing the approach phase shows higher 
deviations than encountered during the cruise phase. 
For the approach phase a mean value of 
µ(xAE) = 92.1633 ft and a variance of 
σ(xAE) = 26.1201 ft were recorded. These values 
represent the accurate path following until the data 
link connection was disrupted and new commands 
were given by ATC. The sudden increase of the 
altitude error, which can be seen in Figure 10, 
accounts for the direct approach to runway 26, which 
was not foreseen in the flight plan. With the 
beginning of the approach to runway 26, the altitude 
error first increased to values up to max(xAE) = 108 ft 
and decreased afterwards to values down to 
min(xAE) = -128 ft. The pilot of the RPAS 
demonstrator initiated the descent for the approach 
independently from the planned altitude, because of 
deviating routing commands from ATC. As a result, 
the recorded values exceed the limits provided by 
EASA, and thus require further system and procedure 
improvements.  
Overall, the analyzed data show that especially 
the lateral deviations stay well within the defined 
performance requirements. In comparison the vertical 
accuracy is acceptable, but needs to be improved for 
real RPAS applications. The vertical deviations in 
this experiment mainly result from manually 
following flight director commands (e.g. focusing on 
lateral accuracy) and unforeseen routing requirements 
from local procedures.  
Issues Encountered 
The RPAS flight in controlled airspace can be 
regarded as safe with regard to robustness and 
reliability. During departure, the systems had to be 
realigned, which resulted in a procedure turn (see 
Figure 2). The only safety critical aspect that was 
encountered during the experiment occurred during 
the approach to EDDP in an area where the data link 
connection was already disruptive. Dynamic 
adaptations to the flight path initiated by ATC could 
not be implemented automatically, because local 
procedures were not considered in the aircraft’s flight 
path calculation. The RPAS demonstrator’s path 
calculation is based completely on published 
procedures, whereas these are not (or only rarely) 
applied in day-to-day traffic. In times of day where 
only low traffic numbers occur, some airports (e.g. 
EDDP) apply local procedures to guide approaching 
and departing aircraft (e.g. by giving vector 
directions), as encountered in the reported flight trial. 
In case of EDDP another aspect increased the amount 
of coordination required during the approach 
  
conducted in this RPAS experiment. The published 
approach procedure from [2] has a final approach fix 
(“LISBA”, see Figure 4) which is located on the 
extended runway center line of the adjacent runway. 
This fact led to confusion and an increase of voice 
communication required as the air traffic controller 
wanted to make sure that runway 26R was 
approached by the RPAS demonstrator. This led to a 
situation of high workload both on the RPAS 
demonstrator and on the ground. 
Discussion 
The results of the flight test and the issues 
encountered show the necessity of knowledge of 
local procedures, but also the ability to adapt the 
flight path during all flight phases. This can be 
realized for beyond radio line of sight (BRLOS) 
operations either (a) by using satellite communication 
or (b) by introducing a new workplace on each hub 
airport with RPAS traffic. This new workplace would 
be responsible for controlling approaching and 
departing RPAS in close coordination with the 
tower/ATC facility. 
The observed flight path following accuracy was 
adequate to comply with existing regulations. It can 
therefore be assumed that the setup used in the trial 
can be used to further demonstration and validation 
activities. 
Integration Concept 
Through the lessons learnt by the flight trial, the 
RPAS integration – at least for large drones operating 
at hub airports – should include the introduction of a 
dedicated workplace. This person would act as a 
dedicated RPAS controller who is able to control all 
approaching RPAS. The workplace should be co-
located with workplaces of the other air traffic 
controllers who are responsible for manned aviation 
at the given airport. This would be an extension of 
the concept proposed in [7]. This setup would have 
several benefits. Firstly, the location would have a 
certain degree of security as the workplaces for air 
traffic controllers are already access controlled – at 
least at hub airports or ATC centers. Secondly, the 
RPAS controller would have knowledge about local 
procedures and specialties at the given airport. This 
would include standard arrivals and procedures, 
traffic mix, traffic peaks and more. Thirdly, a direct 
communication would be ensured with all air traffic 
controllers involved. The risk of a critical data link 
loss would be mitigated. In addition, direct control 
would be ensured throughout this critical phase of 
flight with probably the highest traffic density. 
On the other hand, this would introduce some 
drawbacks as well. Control of the approaching RPAS 
would have to be transferred. This transfer would 
have to be safe and secure and would add additional 
burden to the RPAS and ground systems. In addition, 
some kind of common interface would be required to 
ensure that the dedicated RPAS controller would be 
able to control all kinds of approaching RPAS. 
Manufacturers and operators may be hesitant to hand 
over direct control of the RPAS. This could be 
enforced by international regulations and laws at least 
for given types of airports and operations. 
It would also be imaginable that a sectorless 
concept is used [8]. In such a concept, the dedicated 
RPAS controller at the destination airport is 
responsible for the complete flight without the 
transfer of control. Operators could use an employee 
of the company to avoid passing control to another 
entity. It would still have the advantage, that the 
RPAS controller would have particular knowledge 
about the destination airport and has complete 
awareness of the status of the flight (previous faults 
or malfunctions, performance, etc.).  
Conclusion 
In this paper the results from a flight experiment 
were presented that should demonstrate the validity 
of a concept for RPAS flight in controlled airspace. 
Initial concept underlying the experiment was the 
RPAS behaving similar to manned aviation. This 
“manned aviation look-alike” concept was realized 
by modifying the on-board and ground systems of the 
RPAS to enable communication and navigation 
following the rules for instrumental flight in 
controlled airspace. Safety was ensured by 
conducting the flight with a pilot on board the 
aircraft, who followed the commands from the flight 
director manually. The flight was planned to follow 
published procedures (RNP departure/approach and 
air traffic service routes) with automatic or ground 
controlled adaptations available for possible ATC re-
routings. The flight was conducted between two 
airports (EDVE and EDDP) in Germany and 
involved a cruise flight in FL130. The RPAS was 
controlled by a terrestrial data link system, and it has 
been taken into account in the flight planning that the 
data link would be disrupted when entering the 
  
terminal maneuvering area of EDDP. In this paper, 
not only the flight path following accuracy and the 
data link performance were analyzed, but most 
importantly the applicability of existing procedures in 
controlled airspace when considering BRLOS 
operations was evaluated.  
The results of the flight experiment show a high 
reliability and robustness of the data link. Further on, 
no issues with regard to the on-board systems were 
encountered. Within the data link’s range of 
operation, all required commands and adaptations 
could be transmitted to the RPAS demonstrator. 
Furthermore, the flight following performance was 
evaluated. The RPAS demonstrator followed the 
provided lateral path with high accuracy at all times, 
whereas the vertical deviations differed significantly 
with regard to different flight phases. During level 
flights a high vertical accuracy was recorded, but 
during approach the limits defined by EASA were 
slightly exceeded. These deviations account for one 
major issue that was encountered during the flight 
experiment. Despite very detailed preparation of an 
RPAS flight in controlled airspace by using published 
routing, including high automation or even 
autonomy, the integration into airport procedures still 
requires a close coordination with ATC. Local 
procedures that often require time-critical adaptation 
of the RPAS flight path might be in place. Therefore, 
in this paper a new workplace in the vicinity of the 
airport (preferably together with tower ATC) is 
suggested. The role of this new RPAS controller 
would be to handle all RPAS traffic in close 
coordination with the airport’s ATC. Benefits and 
drawbacks of this solution still have to be examined 
thoroughly. Further research will be conducted within 
the next years to investigate the proposed solution in 
a first step through human-in-the-loop simulations – 
together with air traffic controllers and new RPAS 
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